2008 Woodie Awards
Would you like some opium with your war against terror?
Elizabeth Walker
Issue date: 3/30/07 Section: Opinion
- Page 1 of 3 next >
Judging from a survey of news articles and official reports, the international forces in Afghanistan seem to have two goals: creating a stable, democratic government and eradicating opium production. The first has encountered severe obstacles, but the goal of opium eradication may be even more of a pipe dream.
In 2006, Afghanistan produced an estimated 6,100 metric tons of opium, approximately 92% of world production. It was the largest harvest of opium poppies on record, despite a major attempt by international forces and the Afghan government to destroy poppy fields. That the harvest would actually dramatically increase in the face of eradication programs suggests that efforts to prevent farmers from growing opium poppies are at best ineffective and at worst counter-productive.
Why do the farmers grow opium in the first place? The Afghan government and international organizations often assert that opium production is used to fund the Taliban-who ironically managed to almost wipe out opium production in Afghanistan in 2001-or that some farmers grow opium poppies because they are "greedy."
In reality, the Taliban probably benefits more from the support of outraged farmers who have their crops destroyed by American troops than they do from smuggling opium. Given the dire poverty of most of the Afghan population, accusing the farmers of "greed" is a bit of a stretch.
The reality is that the international community is alarmed by the surge in Afghan opium production because most of that production finds its way into first-world countries as illegal narcotics. For western governments committed to fighting illegal drugs, pressuring the Afghan government to eradicate opium poppies seems like a good idea. These governments believe that opium producers are breaking the law and that if they are stopped, Afghanistan will be a more law-abiding place and there will be fewer drugs on the streets of first-world countries.
This kind of supply-side logic has several flaws. It assumes that Afghan farmers view growing opium poppies as breaking the law, rather than a logical economic choice given the limited options open to them. Opium is one of the most valuable crops that Afghan farmers can grow. For farmers with little access to cash and almost no capital, a poppy field can be used as collateral for loans. Because raw opium is easy to store, it can also act as a household savings account. Opium can get a family through a poor harvest or pay for a wedding. In times of greater instability, growing opium becomes even more attractive because raw opium is portable and easy to sell, produces better returns, and provides greater security than, say, a shed full of corn. It's no wonder that production has dramatically increased since the American invasion.
In 2006, Afghanistan produced an estimated 6,100 metric tons of opium, approximately 92% of world production. It was the largest harvest of opium poppies on record, despite a major attempt by international forces and the Afghan government to destroy poppy fields. That the harvest would actually dramatically increase in the face of eradication programs suggests that efforts to prevent farmers from growing opium poppies are at best ineffective and at worst counter-productive.
Why do the farmers grow opium in the first place? The Afghan government and international organizations often assert that opium production is used to fund the Taliban-who ironically managed to almost wipe out opium production in Afghanistan in 2001-or that some farmers grow opium poppies because they are "greedy."
In reality, the Taliban probably benefits more from the support of outraged farmers who have their crops destroyed by American troops than they do from smuggling opium. Given the dire poverty of most of the Afghan population, accusing the farmers of "greed" is a bit of a stretch.
The reality is that the international community is alarmed by the surge in Afghan opium production because most of that production finds its way into first-world countries as illegal narcotics. For western governments committed to fighting illegal drugs, pressuring the Afghan government to eradicate opium poppies seems like a good idea. These governments believe that opium producers are breaking the law and that if they are stopped, Afghanistan will be a more law-abiding place and there will be fewer drugs on the streets of first-world countries.
This kind of supply-side logic has several flaws. It assumes that Afghan farmers view growing opium poppies as breaking the law, rather than a logical economic choice given the limited options open to them. Opium is one of the most valuable crops that Afghan farmers can grow. For farmers with little access to cash and almost no capital, a poppy field can be used as collateral for loans. Because raw opium is easy to store, it can also act as a household savings account. Opium can get a family through a poor harvest or pay for a wedding. In times of greater instability, growing opium becomes even more attractive because raw opium is portable and easy to sell, produces better returns, and provides greater security than, say, a shed full of corn. It's no wonder that production has dramatically increased since the American invasion.
Be the first to comment on this story